In this section, we discuss how the MySQL privilege system works in relation to NDB Cluster and the implications of this for keeping an NDB Cluster secure.
Standard MySQL privileges apply to NDB Cluster tables. This
includes all MySQL privilege types
(SELECT
privilege,
UPDATE
privilege,
DELETE
privilege, and so on)
granted on the database, table, and column level. As with any
other MySQL Server, user and privilege information is stored in
the mysql
system database. The SQL statements
used to grant and revoke privileges on
NDB
tables, databases containing
such tables, and columns within such tables are identical in all
respects with the GRANT
and
REVOKE
statements used in
connection with database objects involving any (other) MySQL
storage engine. The same thing is true with respect to the
CREATE USER
and
DROP USER
statements.
It is important to keep in mind that, by default, the MySQL
grant tables use the InnoDB
storage
engine. Because of this, those tables are not normally
duplicated or shared among MySQL servers acting as SQL nodes in
an NDB Cluster. In other words, changes in users and their
privileges do not automatically propagate between SQL nodes by
default. If you wish, you can enable synchronization of MySQL
users and privileges across NDB Cluster SQL nodes; see
Section 25.6.13, “Privilege Synchronization and NDB_STORED_USER”, for
details.
Conversely, because there is no way in MySQL to deny privileges
(privileges can either be revoked or not granted in the first
place, but not denied as such), there is no special protection
for NDB
tables on one SQL node from users
that have privileges on another SQL node; this is true even if
you are not using automatic distribution of user privileges. The
definitive example of this is the MySQL root
account, which can perform any action on any database object. In
combination with empty [mysqld]
or
[api]
sections of the
config.ini
file, this account can be
especially dangerous. To understand why, consider the following
scenario:
The
config.ini
file contains at least one empty[mysqld]
or[api]
section. This means that the NDB Cluster management server performs no checking of the host from which a MySQL Server (or other API node) accesses the NDB Cluster.There is no firewall, or the firewall fails to protect against access to the NDB Cluster from hosts external to the network.
The host name or IP address of the NDB Cluster management server is known or can be determined from outside the network.
If these conditions are true, then anyone, anywhere can start a
MySQL Server with --ndbcluster
--ndb-connectstring=
and access this NDB Cluster. Using the MySQL
management_host
root
account, this person can then perform
the following actions:
Execute metadata statements such as
SHOW DATABASES
statement (to obtain a list of allNDB
databases on the server) orSHOW TABLES FROM
statement to obtain a list of allsome_ndb_database
NDB
tables in a given databaseRun any legal MySQL statements on any of the discovered tables, such as:
SELECT * FROM
orsome_table
TABLE
to read all the data from any tablesome_table
DELETE FROM
or TRUNCATE TABLE to delete all the data from a tablesome_table
DESCRIBE
orsome_table
SHOW CREATE TABLE
to determine the table schemasome_table
UPDATE
to fill a table column with “garbage” data; this could actually cause much greater damage than simply deleting all the datasome_table
SETcolumn1
=some_value
More insidious variations might include statements like these:
UPDATE some_table SET an_int_column = an_int_column + 1
or
UPDATE some_table SET a_varchar_column = REVERSE(a_varchar_column)
Such malicious statements are limited only by the imagination of the attacker.
The only tables that would be safe from this sort of mayhem would be those tables that were created using storage engines other than
NDB
, and so not visible to a “rogue” SQL node.A user who can log in as
root
can also access theINFORMATION_SCHEMA
database and its tables, and so obtain information about databases, tables, stored routines, scheduled events, and any other database objects for which metadata is stored inINFORMATION_SCHEMA
.It is also a very good idea to use different passwords for the
root
accounts on different NDB Cluster SQL nodes unless you are using shared privileges.
In sum, you cannot have a safe NDB Cluster if it is directly accessible from outside your local network.
Never leave the MySQL root account password empty. This is just as true when running MySQL as an NDB Cluster SQL node as it is when running it as a standalone (non-Cluster) MySQL Server, and should be done as part of the MySQL installation process before configuring the MySQL Server as an SQL node in an NDB Cluster.
If you need to synchronize mysql
system
tables between SQL nodes, you can use standard MySQL replication
to do so, or employ a script to copy table entries between the
MySQL servers. Users and their privileges can be shared and kept
in synch using the
NDB_STORED_USER
privilege.
Summary. The most important points to remember regarding the MySQL privilege system with regard to NDB Cluster are listed here:
Users and privileges established on one SQL node do not automatically exist or take effect on other SQL nodes in the cluster. Conversely, removing a user or privilege on one SQL node in the cluster does not remove the user or privilege from any other SQL nodes.
You can share MySQL users and privileges among SQL nodes using
NDB_STORED_USER
.Once a MySQL user is granted privileges on an
NDB
table from one SQL node in an NDB Cluster, that user can “see” any data in that table regardless of the SQL node from which the data originated, even if that user is not shared.